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ABSTRACT
A procedure model for the development of an authorization architecture, which spans different IT systems and organizational
units, is presented. Based on a conceptual discussion of authorization and authorization architecture, existing approaches are
discussed. As basic requirements for authorization architecture, a theoretical foundation and a transparent derivation of the
procedure model and activities from successful industry practices are proposed. Actual industry practices are presented as
case studies, and a procedure model is derived by consolidating these practices. Since the inductively derived procedure
model claims reference model status, the paper concludes with a discussion of its genericity and recommendation character.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundament prerequisite for ensuring the security of information systems is the appropriate administration and control of
access rights (Rupprecht and Wortmann 2006). The associated activities, which are grouped together under the term
“authorization” (Jonscher and Dittrich 1994, Pernul 1995, Samarati and de Capitani di Vimercati 2002), confront IT
management with numerous challenges. In the past, inadequate architecture management led to redundancies or gaps in the
system landscape (Winter 2003), particularly in the case of mid-sized and large enterprises. In the authorization environment,
inadequate management means that the individual systems usually possess independent and therefore redundant modules
which from the implementation perspective are nonetheless proprietary and mutually incompatible (Kern et al. 2002).
Moreover, in the case of standard software there is virtually no other option than to use the system-specific authorization
components. In practice, the administration and control of access rights are largely performed on a system-related basis due
to the proprietary components, which means that cross-system transparency regarding access rights and an efficient
administration can only be achieved to a limited degree (Kern et al. 2002). In particular, this lack of transparency stands in
contradiction to increasing regulatory requirements (Hartje et al. 2003, Menzies et al. 2004, Robinson 2005), such as e.g.
those imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Congress of the United States of America 2002).
The goal of this paper is therefore to derive a procedure model which is aimed at developing cross-system and enterprise-
wide authorization architectures for the medium and long-term planning and design of authorization infrastructures. As a first
step, the fundamental principles of authorization are explained, and the elements of an authorization architecture discussed.
Current approaches from the areas of authorization, architecture and security management are then investigated in respect of
existing procedures for developing authorization architectures. This is followed by the identification of requirements which
the procedure model to be developed will need to satisfy. Since existing approaches have provided little detail in respect of
the focus of this paper, a procedure model is therefore derived inductively on the basis of selected case studies. Finally, the
derived model is evaluated by means of the identified requirements.
AUTHORIZATION ARCHITECTURE
Authorization and Authorization Architecture
Authorization or its synonym access control (Pernul 1995) denotes the verification and administration of access rights
(Rupprecht and Wortmann 2006). The verification of access rights is defined as the process of conveying queries to the
resources and data of a system, and deciding whether a query should be accepted or rejected (Samarati and de Capitani di
Vimercati 2002). The administration of access rights encompasses the granting, withdrawal and maintenance of access rights.
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Key elements of the authorization architecture are (1) the authorization processes and (2) authorization components and their
interaction. The authorization processes encompass the activities for the administration and control of access rights
(Rupprecht and Wortmann 2006). Authorization components are software components which provide functionalities for the
administration and/or control of access rights (Wortmann 2006). The concrete authorizations exist in the form of
authorization concepts. An authorization concept encompasses the rules depicted in the information technology which define
which user can access which methods and/or data objects (Wortmann 2006). A specific authorization concept encompasses
system-specific rules. An enterprise-wide authorization concept encompasses cross-system rules.
An authorization architecture is specified by means of models, directives and lead elements:
· Models: Structural facts are depicted with the aid of differentiated, aggregated, static (architecture) models (Hafner
2005). These models of the overall context primarily serve the purposes of communication and coordination.
· Directives: In practice, widely varying terms such as “standards”, “rules”, “guidelines” or “instructions” are used in
the context of directives (Hafner 2005). The goal of directives is to provide statements that can be applied to a total
universe of problems which is as broad as possible (Hafner 2005).
· Lead elements: Although the design of an architecture primarily envisages the structuring of an information system,
it also provides concrete artifacts when necessary (Birkhölzer and Vaupel 2003). The goal is to investigate
individual design options for applicability, e.g. by specifying or developing concrete infrastructure components,
and/or to provide key artifacts (Hafner 2005).
·
Measures which can be grouped together according to content aspects to form complexes of measures describe the
implementation of the authorization architecture. Here, the models, directives and lead elements used to specify the
architecture are to be assigned in particular to the organization architecture (sequence and responsibilities of authorization
processes) and the IT architecture (technical structure of authorization infrastructures ) (Wortmann 2006).
State of the Art of Authorization Architecture Development
For the purposes of this review, approaches were analyzed which can be utilized for the development of a suitable procedure
model and thus (1) refer explicitly to the topics of authorization and architecture, (2) include or focus on a procedure model,
(3) with regard to their level of abstraction allow sufficiently concrete discussion and (4) are implementation-oriented and/or
have already been used in practice.
Approaches from the area of security management discuss procedures to ensure the security of information systems (A-SIT
2004). Many national [e.g. (BSI 2004)] and international [e.g. (ISO 1997)] standards describe the elementary activities of
security management, but they only reveal little detail when it comes to the specific topic of authorization architecture.
Approaches from the field of cross-system authorization deal in particular with the structure and interaction of authorization
components as well as with the associated design and development of authorization concepts. Here, the discussion centers on
the one hand on the way in which key authorization components can be provided as infrastructure [e.g. (Kern et al. 2004)].
On the other hand, it focuses on whether and, if so, how the access rights of different authorization components can be
integrated on a cross-system basis [e.g. (Roeckle et al. 2000, Kern et al. 2002, Kuhlmann et al. 2003). However, there is no
emphasis on procedures for the medium and long-term planning of authorization infrastructures.
In summary it can be said that the approaches taken from the fields discussed provide little detail with regard to the main
topic of this paper. In particular, there is a lack of sufficiently specific procedure models on which to draw for the
development of authorization architectures. Moreover, a large proportion of the approaches are neither theoretically well-
founded nor transparently derived from current practices. For this reason, empirical projects are presented in the following
section in the form of case studies which subsequently provide the starting point for derivation of the procedure model. First
of all, however, major requirements which must be met by the procedure model to be developed are derived and defined.
REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET BY THE DERIVED PROCEDURE MODEL
The procedure model is to be derived with aim of achieving reference model status. It must therefore satisfy the two typical
properties of a reference model (vom Brocke 2003): reference models are generic under certain conditions defined in the
model, i.e. they can be used for a category of applications. In addition, they possess reference character.
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Genericity and Reference Character
Genericity denotes the extent to which a developed reference model can be used by different enterprises (vom Brocke 2003).
The criterion of genericity is to be considered as critical, particularly from the constructivist perspective, since objective
applicability does not exist in constructivist terms (vom Brocke 2003): the acceptance of a reference model results solely
from the perception of the individual subject. Even if the genericity of a reference model can consequently only be achieved
with limitations, the procedure model to be developed nonetheless lays claim to cross-industry genericity. In particular, it
should be suitable for large enterprises which are characterized by heterogeneous, historically evolved application landscapes
and therefore security landscapes.
The identification of structural analogies and/or patterns by means of induction constitutes an important starting point for
satisfying the requirement for genericity (Schütte 1998). In this paper, the derivation of the procedure models takes the
importance of induction into account and is based in particular on the generalization of case studies. During the course of
development, however, a deductive and/or argumentative approach should also be adopted in order to support and extend the
inductive findings.
The recommendation character of a procedure model encompasses the claim to possess exemplary properties in the sense of
a reference procedure (Braun et al. 2005). Here, the verifiability of the recommendation content proves to be problematic
(vom Brocke 2003). The question of whether recommendation character exists is not decided until the procedure model is
applied and thus depends on its perceived suitability taking into account the specific circumstances of the case. For reference
modeling, it is emphasized that the development of a reference model on the basis of a defined goal and/or requirements
system is only possible within certain limitations as it is not possible to establish a generic goal system (Schütte 1998). The
recommendation character of the procedure model to be developed can therefore only be ensured and proven to a limited
extent on the basis of goals and requirements. In the context of this paper, the genericity of the requirements system is to be
addressed by basing the derivation of the concrete requirements to be met by the procedure model, which is to be performed
in the following section, exclusively on established security standards.
Requirements from Security Management
In recent years efforts have increased both at national and international level to develop harmonized procedures to ensure the
security of information systems (A-SIT 2004). The explanations given below are based on the ISO/EIC Standard 13335
“Guidelines for the Management of IT Security“ (ISO 1997) as a harmonized method of this kind since it is widely accepted
and deals in depth with the organization and implementation of security in the form of a code of practice (BITKOM 2005).
The broad acceptance of this standard is attributable to the fact that many European countries were involved in its
development.
Within the second part of the ISO standard, “Managing and Planning IT Security”, the activities of security management are
described which are summarized as follows (A-SIT 2004):
· Development of a corporate IT security policy: The corporate IT security policy encompasses the guidelines and
specifications which define the fundamental goals, strategies, responsibilities and methods for ensuring IT security.
· Risk analysis: A major task of security management is the recognition and assessment of security risks as well as
their reduction to an appropriate level.
· Development of a security concept: On the basis of the identified risks, it is important to develop measures to reduce
the residual risk to an appropriate level. In the case of complex IT systems, individual IT security policies should be
developed which not only describe guidelines and specifications for the particular system but also concrete security
measures and their implementation.
· Implementation of a security plan: Implementation of the measures developed must be accompanied by awareness-
building and training activities. Moreover, it is important to make sure that the concrete implementations satisfy the
guidelines and specifications which have been drafted (“accreditation”).
· IT security in continuous operation: Security management also includes the task of maintaining and if necessary
adapting security in continuous operation.
·
The procedure model to be developed is dedicated to the conceptual development of authorization architectures, which means
that the development activities of security management form the relevant starting point. The following requirements can be
derived from the respective activities of security management:
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Security Management








The development of a corporate IT security policy is not the object of
the procedure model to be developed. This procedure must
nonetheless comply with existing security guidelines and
specifications.
Risk analysis Performance of a risk
analysis




On the basis of the identified risks, appropriate measures must be
derived to reduce the residual risk to an appropriate level.
Development of an
IT security concept
Definition of guidelines In the case of complex IT systems, separate guidelines should be
developed which constitute concrete procedural instructions.
Table 1: Requirements to be met by the Procedure Model
DERIVATION OF THE PROCEDURE MODEL
In order to ensure that the procedure model is derived transparently, two procedure models from the world of practice are first
outlined in the next section. These were developed as case studies on the basis of interviews and document analysis. These
cases were selected because the companies concerned had many years of experience-based know-how in the development
and maintenance of security architectures. In addition, both companies had possessed an extensive security and authorization
infrastructure for some time. The chapter concludes with an inductive derivation of the consolidated procedure model on the
basis of these case studies.
Case Study A: Credit Suisse
The development and implementation of the present authorization architecture at Credit Suisse began in 2000, having
identified improvement potentials in the granting of access rights according to the “need to know” principle. The “Position
Paper on Access Control” in mid 2000 first provided an overview of the as-is status of authorization and on this basis
developed the beginnings of a solution for the identified challenges. The conceptual work was then continued within the
framework of two projects: the “authorization architecture” specified the to-be situation for authorization in the form of
standards which stipulate the fundamental aspects of authorization. At the same time, the more comprehensive “security
architecture” was developed which assesses the measures elaborated in the “authorization architecture”. Figure 1 shows the
main phases and activities for derivation of the authorization architecture, which are explained in greater detail in the next
section. The broken line in Figure 1 indicates the iterative procedure: during the course of time the developed concepts were
structured with an increasing level of detail.
The development of fundamental principles was performed at the start of the conceptual work. The security architecture
model was developed within the framework of the security architecture (activity 1.1) in order to delimit and subdivide the
universe of discourse of different security architectures. Development of the security architecture and authorization
architecture was performed on the basis of internationally recognized standards. The standards were adapted to the needs of
Credit Suisse in the respective documentation (activity 1.2). On the basis of the security standard ISO/IEC 17799, key
security requirements were elaborated which needed to be taken into account in the proposed solutions (activity 1.3). Finally,
key terminology was defined and compiled in the form of a glossary (activity 1.4).
Selected authorization components were analyzed in conjunction with recording the as-is situation (activity 2.1). Key
components were evaluated amongst others according to the criteria “field of application”, “database”, “access rights” and
“security check”. Use of the individual authorization components is described under the heading “field of application”.
“Database” focuses on the data sets which are used as the basis for authorization checks. “Access rights” and “security
checks” describe the fundamental authorization concept behind the respective components as well as the type and scope of
existing rights. Existing as well as new authorization requirements were identified during its preparation (activity 2.2).
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Figure 1. Credit Suisse Procedure Model
Definition of the to-be situation for authorization began as early as mid 2000 with the development of fundamental
architecture concepts (activity 3.1) which were described in the form of medium and long-term solution scenarios. Finally,
with the authorization architecture, the architecture department developed a detailed description of the to-be situation by
defining standards (activity 3.2) which stipulate fundamental aspects of authorization. A summary of the to-be situation can
be found in the roadmap of the security architecture.
The derivation of initiatives and measures for authorization encompassed the development complexes of measures (activity
4.1) in conjunction with the authorization architecture. The prioritization of these complexes of measures (activity 4.2) was
then performed as part of the security architecture in the roadmap document. The costs of the complexes of measures and
their benefits in the form of the anticipated security gain were used as evaluation criteria for this purpose.
Case Study B: Winterthur Group
The development of a comprehensive authorization architecture for Winterthur took place within the framework of two
projects. The Winterthur project “CC AIM” produced the first approaches to a solution in the area of authorization in 2004.
The “Winterthur Security Architecture” project in 2005 built on the work of the CC AIM project. Figure 2 shows the project
procedure for deriving the authorization architecture at Winterthur. Once again, the main project phases and their activities
are stated. A special feature of this project was the “define to-be situation” phase: these activities are performed in parallel
with one another with permanent coordination. The broken line in Figure 2 again indicates the iterative procedure.
The first phase of the projects involved developing the fundamental principles. The topics of data protection and data security
were used as the starting point for elaborating the question of authorization (activity 1.1). By investigating case studies and
literature, the working group looked at initial concrete solution scenarios for Winterthur (activity 1.2). Requirements which
have to be taken into account for authorization in heterogeneous system landscapes were then discussed in the light of
international security standards (activity 1.3).
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Figure 2. Winterthur Group Procedure Model
The as-is situation was analyzed on the basis of the requirements and solution scenarios discussed. Selected applications
were investigated in respect of authorization (activity 2.1). In addition to the applications, the working group investigated and
evaluated individual authorization components (activity 2.2). The analysis of the selected applications and systems concluded
with the identification of key problem areas (activity 2.3).
Subsequent definition of the to-be situation involved developing fundamental architecture concepts (activity 3.1) which
defined key responsibilities and rules within the framework of the selected architecture scenarios (activity 3.2) as well as
defining and specifying selected solution modules (activity 3.3).
In the final phase, initiatives and measures were derived. Complexes  of  measures  were  identified  on  the  basis  of  the
determined improvement potentials and the elaborated target solutions (activity 4.1). The individual measures in these
complexes were described and briefly characterized, the dependencies between measures documented and responsibilities
assigned (activity 4.2). To conclude, the complexes of measures were prioritized (activity 4.3).
Derivation of the Consolidated Procedure Model
The induction of the consolidated procedure model consists of two steps and is based on the construction of reference models
(Schütte 1998, Brocke vom 2003). First of all, the activities encompassing similar functional tasks are consolidated in the
induced procedure model (cf. Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Derived Procedure Model
To ensure the transparency of the derivation the corresponding activities in the case studies are stated for each derived
activity in the depicted procedure model. The results of the activities play a special role in the derivation. Activities with the
same or similar results indicate functional units which are to be consolidated. In the figure, the activities have already been
assigned to the induced phases. The derivation of the phases was performed analogously to the definition of activities by
consolidating phases that comprise similar task units. Activities marked as “optional” only originate from one of the case
studies analyzed.
Finally, the derivation of the procedure model is performed. The temporal flows between the phases and activities in the
induced procedure model are defined on the basis of behavioral identities (Schütte 1998): similar activity sequences are
consolidated in the induced procedure model. An overview of the individual phases with their activities is outlined in the
following section.
The basic foundations for developing the authorization architecture are laid as part of the preliminary study. At the beginning
of the phase it is important to delimit and subdivide the universe of discourse for the architecture to be developed (activity
1.1) in order to ensure complete development of the architecture with minimum overlap. Development of the authorization
architecture can build on existing contributions from science and practice which are available e.g. in the form of literature or
standards. These contributions must be collected and reviewed in accordance with the application context (activity 1.2).
Security standards such as ISO 17799 stipulate that the requirements to be met by authorization must be collected and
documented (ISO 2000). The requirements must thus be defined before the actual architecture itself (activity 1.3). To
encourage the use of uniform language in the area of authorization it is advisable to introduce a glossary which defines and
documents the specialist terminology employed (activity 1.4).
In the “document as-is situation” phase, weak points are determined which then serve as the starting point for development of
the architecture. Selected authorization components are evaluated in order to ensure that the weaknesses of individual
authorization components are adequately addressed (activity 2.2). Above and beyond this, it is advisable to analyze selected
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applications with a view to identifying cross-system weak points in authorization (activity 2.1). Finally, the results of the
preceding activities are consolidated: key problem areas are identified by clustering and weighting the weak points found
(activity 2.3).
The goal of the “specify to-be situation” phase is to develop the main design options and procedural instructions for resolving
identified problems. Essential aspects of the to-be authorization architecture are established by defining and selecting key
design options (activity 3.1). Important solution principles on which the developed design options are based are recorded in
writing and detailed in the form of directives (activity 3.2). In addition, individual design options are investigated for
applicability by specifying or developing concrete infrastructure components (activity 3.3). Within the framework of the case
studies it was shown that the activities in this phase are closely coordinated and performed in parallel.
The  last  phase,  “define complexes of measures”, involves identifying complexes of measures to implement the developed
approaches.  As  a  first  step,  measures  must  be  derived  on  the  basis  of  the  results  already  obtained  and  bundled  to  form
complexes of measures taking into account semantic correlations (activity 4.1). Finally, it is necessary to prioritize the
complexes of measures identified and to check whether they ensure an appropriate reduction of the discovered risks (activity
4.2).
Evaluation of the Consolidated Procedure Model
The procedure model resulting from the preceding sections claims genericity and also aspires to achieve recommendation
character. The extent to which the presented procedure model fulfills these two aspects is outlined in the following section.
The identification of structural analogies provides an important basis for satisfying the requirement for genericity (Schütte
1998). An analysis of the case studies in respect of structural analogies highlights numerous commonalities. Both case studies
reveal appropriate phases with corresponding core activities: development of the fundamental principles is the first step,
followed by analysis of the as-is situation, then definition of the to-be situation. Finally, complexes of measures are derived
on the basis of the activities performed. Thus, as with the approaches to security management, the procedure first envisages
the identification and evaluation of existing weak points so that measures can subsequently be developed to eliminate weak
points while considering the risks. As a consequence, the commonalities of the case studies can be explained in terms of
content. This means that semantic structural analogies (Schütte 1998) exist which justify the claim of the consolidated
procedure to genericity.
The recommendation character of the outlined procedure model can only be secured and proven with certain limitations
(vom Brocke 2003). The requirements defined in section 3 for this purpose are addressed as follows by the inductively
derived procedure model:
· Inclusion of existing guidelines and specifications: Within the framework of the induced procedure model, existing
guidelines and specifications are included through the activity “collect authorization requirements” in the
“preliminary study” phase.
· Performance of a risk analysis: In order to satisfy the principle of operational efficiency, existing weak points must
be identified, evaluated and only then addressed in accordance with the risk. The induced procedure model tackles
these aspects in the “record as-is situation” phase. Risks are identified by analyzing applications and systems and
subsequently evaluated.
· Derivation of appropriate measures: On the basis of the identified risks, measures have to be derived which reduce
the risks to an appropriate level. The induced procedure model takes these requirements into account in the phases
“define to-be situation” and “define complexes of measures”. The “define to-be situation” phase encompasses the
activities for developing design options and guidelines. The “define complexes of measures” phase bundles
measures which are necessary for implementing the design options to form complexes of measures. These are then
evaluated to promote implementation of the complexes of measures with the best cost-benefit ratio.
· Definition of guidelines: In the case of complex IT systems, security standards envisage the development of
guidelines which constitute concrete procedural instructions. This is the equivalent of developing directives, which
is to be performed within the activity “specify directives”.
·
Consequently, the induced procedure model addresses the requirements developed. However, the question of whether the
requirements developed are adequately addressed will only be decided when the procedure model is applied and thus depends
on the circumstances (vom Brocke 2003).
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SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The aim of this paper is to derive a procedure model for the development of cross-system and enterprise-wide authorization
architectures for the medium and long-term planning and design of authorization infrastructures. For this purpose,
fundamental approaches to authorization were first explained and key elements of an authorization architecture discussed.
Existing approaches to the development of a cross-system and enterprise-wide authorization architecture are not very detailed
and are neither theoretically well-founded nor transparently derived from current practices. During the course of this paper,
therefore, empirical projects in the form of case studies were presented which constitute the starting point for development of
a procedure model. The subsequent, inductively derived procedure model aspires to reference model status. In this respect it
was necessary to conclude by examining the extent to which the obtained procedure model fulfills the two aspects of
“genericity” and “recommendation character”.
The resulting procedure model encompasses the four phases “preliminary study”, “record as-is situation”, “define to-be
situation” and “define complexes of measures”. The preliminary study involves laying the basic foundations (e.g. structuring
the topic area, collecting requirements) for the development of an authorization architecture. In the “record as-is situation”
phase, weak points are identified and serve as the starting point for architecture development. The goal of the “define to-be
situation” phase is to develop essential design options and procedural instructions to resolve the identified weak points.
Finally, in the last phase, “define complexes of measures”, complexes of measures are identified to implement the developed
approaches.
Further research work should be aimed at validation of these results on the basis of broader-scale case studies. Moreover, it
would be advisable to further refine the procedure model in order to obtain detailed procedural instructions for individual
activities. The developed model could also be integrated into existing approaches in architecture and security management.
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